Consider the following 3-step argument drawn out by myself during an enlightening discussion prior to the viewing of a certain Star Trek movie that I highly recommend:
Assumption 1: One is uncertain of all things physical.
Assumption 2: One is certain of the self.
Conclusion: The self is not physical.
Those who dispute the conclusion are most likely to oppose the first of the two assumptions (the second is generally accepted), so I'll state a brief defense: to be physical is to exist objectively. One's interaction with objects he supposes to be physical consists only of his perceptions. Perceptions are inherently fallible- i.e., one's senses are always subject to failure- therefore, though they cause him to suppose objects are physical, they can never this guarantee.
Should we accept the conclusion, we can reason the self must be the conscious mind.
Should we accept that other, physical things exist- because they probably do- and likewise the relevance of the physical sciences, we can mold a reasonable theory for brain-mind interaction. Because observances of the physical world suggest it operates solely by physical law- and, being the simplest explanation, it is the one we should accept- the brain's movements are due to chemical factors. However, these movements in their vast complexity and unique intricacies result in the formation of independent and non-physical minds. These minds experience qualia as governed by changes in the brain.
Let's accept that theory and see where it takes us.
If a careful and specific arrangement of physical matter 'x' results in the formation of a given mind 'y', we can assume that whenever x is formed, the associated mind is formed also.
At any given point in time, there is a chance 'z' that arrangement x is formed, where z > 0 (though likely by only an inconceivably small amount).
Given infinite time (another assumption), x, and thusly y, will certainly form an infinite number of times.
Therefore, the mind is not permanently destructible and the self is immortal.
Although it may be an exceedingly great duration of time before x reforms after any given deterioration of its construct, any period of time for which x is not present, y is also not present, meaning that, to y, who is not conscious of this time, it is seemingly instantaneous.
If the theory is true, there is never the inconceivable "nothing." Immediately following one's "death"- that is, when the brain decays to such a point where it no longer brings to being the mind, he will find himself made anew in some future time, not necessarily possessing the same body, but certainly possessing, by necessity, the same brain.
Let's go back over some of the assumptions made to see if they're reasonable:
1. The self is the conscious mind, which is non-physical.
2. There exists a physical universe.
3. Any given conscious mind is formed by a given brain, the movements of which determine the qualia of said mind.
4. At any given time, there is some chance- always greater than 0- that any given brain will form in the physical universe.
5. Time in the physical universe is infinite.
And now for a few points of clarification:
With regard to assumption 2, with which I think few disagree, its falsity would remove the need for justification of immortality in the first place, as, without the assumption of brain deterioration which results in the mind's destruction, we'd have no reason to assume the self would ever die.
With regard to assumption 4, the chance that this brain forms must be greater than 0 due to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Because there is pure randomness, any material construct has some very slight possibility of spontaneously forming.
With regard to assumption 5, I am aware that many theories suppose that the duration of the universe is finite, and for good reason, but most conclude, ultimately, that this is not equal to "the end of time," which is decidedly impossible, nor is it equivalent to the end of all future physical universes. If we are to suppose, quite reasonably, that the ultimate fate of the universe is heat death, big freeze, big crunch- whatever product of physical cosmology you might ascribe to- but that, as time still continues, a new universe will inevitably form at some future date- and further, that this process will repeat without end- then the requirements for the initial assumption, and likewise the conclusion of self-immortality, still hold. Though it's true that any given universe may form with physical laws different to our own, which may or may not allow it to construct a given brain that forms a given mind, if there are infinite future universes, there will also be infinite future universes that do possess the required physical laws, and therefore an infinite span of time over which there is the possibility that a given brain is formed, and therefore, with certainty, an infinite span of time in which the mind formed by said brain will exist.
Interestingly, if we accept the conclusion, it allows us to prove a number of other things.
Suppose the universe were of an infinite size. As expressed in our assumptions, there is always a positive chance that a given brain forms at a given time. To amend this statement for greater specificity, there is a positive chance of a given brain forming at a given time for a given region of space*. If there is infinite space, the number of times a given brain forms is certainly infinite, and all minds which have consciousness of at least one brain would necessarily have consciousness of infinite brains.
Because I do not have consciousness of infinite brains, the size of the universe is finite.
Further, the theory of infinite parallel universes simultaneously existing must also be false, as this would still allow for infinite space in which a given brain could form-- if there is more than one universe, it is necessarily the case that only a finite number of them exist. Since no theory suggests a simplified explanation for known events given a finite number of universes >1, we should conclude that only one universe exists at any given time.
A noteworthy point on my theory of consciousness:
Thus far in my stated assumptions and conclusions I've referenced a brain construct x as forming a consciousness y- implying that an exact state of physical matter is necessary for the formation of a given consciousness. Though I believe this to be the truth, I don't believe it to be the whole truth. A given brain is in a state of constant physical fluctuation, both chemical and neuronal, and yet, if we are to accept memory as reliable, it seems as though the same consciousness remains. Though the perceptions of the consciousness will be altered by any physical change to the brain, the consciousness itself- the perceiver- is still the same perceiver. In other words, while the physical state of a brain has a "range" of being, the unphysical state of a consciousness has only one state of being- being a given perceiver. I therefore suppose that a mind y is formed not by one exact construct of physical matter, but by a range of constructs that contain similar necessary features.
Either way the conclusion holds- that the self is immortal- but if it is not the case that a consciousness forms as result of any of a range of slightly different brains (i.e., it only forms as result of one, exact physical construction) then the theory of infinite parallel universes is not necessarily false; while it requires infinite space, it does not allow for two otherwise identical brains to simultaneously exist in the same space, and any two brains are thusly necessarily physically different in at least this respect.
As I said before, as the only reasonable requirement for the formation of a mind is a given brain- or, more likely, just some physical brain-thing similar to one's current brain that meets a less-restrictive level of prerequisites- which could inhabit any body or any thing, I find the theory more akin to reincarnation than immortality, in the traditional sense of those words, where one never gets to choose what his brain controls, or the option to stop existing.
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*-hopefully this makes sense to you because I don't really feel like explaining it. Comment if you don't understand or disagree.
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ReplyDeleteI have a couple of problems with this.
ReplyDeleteFirst, and less pressing, is your discussion of infinite time. From what I understand, time at the boundaries of a universe's formation or death ceases to have meaning as we traditionally ascribe to it--time did not pass in the way that we usually think of time passing at the big bang, and nor would it in some sort of final singularity. Speaking of "the end of time" ceases to be a useful term or means of looking at the issue, as time ceases to appear as a linear and bounded flow. But I am not a cosmology expert, so I may have to defer on this point.
Secondly, you discussion of consciousness. If the same brain forms, with the exact same physical characteristics, at a different time, is it the same consciousness? The brain may behave in all the same ways, undergo all the same changes, and be identical to the earlier version, but is it the same perceiver? I see no reason why the same body might not form, but the consciousness, though identical, is not "me." My perception may end with my body. By a similar argument, there is no reason why multiple same "selves" may not exist in the same universe. Consider, for example, the idea of a computer built to exactly simulate the brain conditions of a given person--every neuron, every connection, every probability. Yes, this scenario is wildly fanciful, and of course it isn't certain that computers can model a brain, but imagine. Would you be "aware" of this computer's thoughts? Would this computer "be" your consciousness? Would your consciousness, as a perceiver, transfer over both? I am inclined to think not, and inclined to think that as perceivers we function differently than you say.
For a fascinating discussion of this subject, I suggest you read here: http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/Dennett-WhereAmI.pdf
With regard to time, we needn't concern ourselves with the irregularities in its "flow." Provided we assume that after the end of a universe a new one is formed, as is believed by many physical cosmologists including Stephen Hawking, it is certain that there will be an infinite space of time- that is, time as we understand it- during which there will exist a physical universe with laws that allow for the construction of any given brain. I'm not concerned with arguing whether or not the formation of infinite universes over the course of time is an accurate theory because I don't understand the field well enough to do so, but I'm quite interested in the logical consequences of such a concept, which seems perfectly reasonable.
DeleteBeing that the nature of a physical object depends only on its construction and its location (relative to other things) and *not* on the time during which it exists, we must conclude that if two brains are formed where these properties are identical, they are literally the same. If they are physically the same, the only way they could produce a different mind is if something had an influence on the creation of minds other than the physical world- and whatever that might be, there's no evidence of its existence. We should conclude, therefore- being the simplest explanation- that it is only the physical universe which creates minds, that it is the brain which does this (based on clear evidence in psychology) and that, therefore, two brains which are the same produce the same consciousness-- the same perceiver.
It is impossible for a computer-brain to be constructed that is exactly physically identical to my own while existing at the same time as my own because they cannot both inhabit the same space. It is also not the case that the computer would ever be my consciousness because, as I stated earlier, the consciousness is non-physical (although it is entirely possible such a computer could create my non-physical consciousness). That said, as I did explain in my noteworthy point, I also believe that two given brains don't have to be exactly identical to produce the same consciousness, but that a range of brains which have similar physical features could all produce one self. I see no problem with the idea of multiple highly similar brains existing simultaneously and having resultantly a perceiver that perceives through multiple brains. Psychological studies on twins conjoined at the head from birth may or may not help to confirm this theory- I'd be interested to research it- but I certainly don't find your inclination by intuition an adequate statement of rejection to the possibility.
I appreciate the article.
I had misunderstood you, and thought that location was not one of your criteria for sameness. What I had meant by the computer scenario is something like is described in the Dennett article, which, as you see, has interesting consequences. You also contradicted yourself to an extent, as you allowed for the possibility of multiple "same" brains in different spatial locations during your "infinite universe" proof, using at as the key to your doubt. With this criterion, that proof no longer stands.
DeleteMore importantly, the inclusion of location defeats your argument on its own. If you agree that temporality has some bearing on location (if, knowing anything about physics, you must), you also agree that no matter how exactly the spatial location of a brain is duplicated, its temporal location will never be, and thus its sameness is not only not guaranteed, but never possible. Each brain, and thus each perceiver, can only exist once. It would be arbitrary to say that "sameness" requires occupying the same space, but not at the same time, especially given how tied we understand space and time to be.
As to the point in your note, in which it sounds like you mean to drop the location criterion, my above objection stands. There is no reason why the consciousness need span across the intervening space, even given extensive physical similarity of the brains. I still see a possibility where a physically duplicate brain is across the room from me, but I do not feel what it feels. I see no reason why this need be false. Speaking in your terms, there is no reason why two brains must create the same one nonphysical consciousness as opposed to two, unless they are in fact the same brain and there is only one. You would have to add in a whole lot of work about the nature of consciousness in order to say that this is not true. This argument means that to create the same consciousness, two brains must be spatially and temporally identical, in effect limiting our consciousness to just us, forever.
As a side note, the opening argument is a shoddy one. Put more accurately, it looks like this:
1. We are uncertain of everything perceived through sense data.
2. We are certain of the self.
3. The self is not perceived through sense data.
Unless you add
4. All things perceived through sense data are physical, and only those things are physical.
You don't get that the self is the only non-physical thing. I do think that it's possible for the self to be physically based in a way that's stronger than you mean here without it being directly physically sensed, contradicting 4.
I concede on one account- if you assume only one, exact physical construction produces a given consciousness, that the consciousness is immortal... this is indeed false- but it is irrelevant to my conclusions, seeing as that is almost certainly not the case, as explained in my noteworthy point. If you really believe that all physical attributes of a brain must precisely align- composition and location alike- then you must consider one's consciousness to be in a state of constant flux. That is, you only exist *now*, at this point in time, with false memories and a false prediction that you will live even a moment longer. After all, chemical reactions are about to slightly alter the physical composition of your brain, or maybe you'll tilt your head. Either that, or you reject all modern science with regard to the brain, and believe it to be physically unchanging in line with Plato and Aristotle. It's technically *possible*- that is, nothing we are literally epistemologically certain of contradicts the possibility- that every relevant scientist is mistaken or that you are an entity with but a second to live, but those are bad explanations of what is most likely true.
DeleteEvery single moment the composition of your brain is physically changing, the pieces within it are moving, It's location is shifting, and everything around it experiences alteration in kind. Yet *you* are still in it (or so we assume). You have been the perceiver of innumerable physically different brains, which allows us to conclude- as surely as you've existed for longer than a heartbeat- that one's consciousness is attached not to one, exact arrangement of physical matter x, but to a range of different arrangements of physical matter, x - x'. Everything between x and x' likely contains key physical characteristics that are essential to your existence (keep in mind, you are your consciousness - so my theory holds), but we know there can be many physical differences. Phineas Gage remains the perfect example- one whose brain was made as different as a railroad spike could manage. Though "no longer Gage" by personality, he remained Gage in actuality- that is, through this new brain remained consciousness: Gage.
Lets take your own example: a physically duplicate brain across the room. Consider the implications of suggesting that the consciousness therein isn't *you*. Your brain, X, is located at position A in the room, and the other brain, Y, at position B, during time T. Surely we can agree that although X is at A at time T, you could have chosen for X to be at B during time T- simply by walking to the other end of the room. It could have been, at time T, that X was at B and Y at A- there's no logical contradiction. Had that been so, where then would your consciousness perceive? Still through X, and *only* X? Why? Physically, there is absolutely *no* difference between X at B at time T and Y at B at time T. We must conclude that if X at B at time T is a sufficient physical arrangement through which your consciousness can perceive, Y at B at time T is also.
The opening argument is substantially different from your "more accurate" depiction by any reasonable definition of "physical", which is not "that which is perceived through sense data," but "that which possesses physical properties", such as position and mass. That something possesses physical properties is unknown and unknowable; the known state of everything known is either a perception or a perceiver- these are non-physical.
My bad on the opening argument--I thought you were going for a Cartesian line of argument based on your "we are certain of the self" line, but that was me putting words into your mouth. I still think there's an issue with that proof though. There seems to be a little slip up in physical or physically based...we may be certain of the self, but we are uncertain about its specific physical origin, so we might keep both our certainty of it and the uncertainty about physicality while still being logically sound. I'm thinking along the lines of the neo-Cartesian brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. but anyway.
ReplyDeleteOn the other point, yes. so now we've run into the problem of what exactly it means to compose something, and what it means to have continuity through time. And I think that you have hit on it, and stated it more clearly in your more recent post--it's based on a specific physical arrangement of atoms or elements or neurons.
So now let's tackle your example, and the restated version in the later post: I actually think that you can follow that thought experiment all the way up to its end point, and not grant the conclusion. Yes, X at B would still be X. As we agreed, an unchanging physical location is not necessary for the continuity of X. None of ANY of that example was related to the ability of X to perceive across multiple brains. Yes, X would still be X if the places were switched. Yes, if a coin were flipped, we would have swapped places. I could, theoretically, be conscious of my brain in any given point in the universe, if I had traveled there. None of that in any way means that if a second brain were to exist in another location that my awareness would extend. Just because there is no physical difference does not mean awareness would extend--I granted you physical identicality in my last comment. But what if my consciousness is based in my atoms, no matter of someone else has the same arrangement and an identical, though separate, consciousness? You have made an argument about location and extended it to awareness. To me, that extension looks unsupported. Enlighten me if I'm missing a key element, or elucidate your proof further.
What would it even mean, if we could extend across multiple brains, to be aware? What could awareness possibly be tied to? Is it some mysterious substance, like the luminiferous ether of pre-Einstein, that extends everywhere? Unless you're going to either make that argument a whole lot more general (i.e. argue that the universe as a whole is just one big consciousness) or try to lay groundwork for some pretty crazy new theories, I don't see that argument going anywhere. I don't mean that just as an argument from queerness, but as one of being unsupportable.
Your "physical" vs "physically based" distinction leads me to conclude that we are thinking of the definition in completely different ways. Consider a guitar-- you see it, and it's there, but in what form? I pose it exists in two: a non-physical perception of a guitar, and a physical guitar. The perception is not physical by virtue of being "physically based" or anything else- it is a perception, and as such has no mass or position and is independent of the physical world. Further, while we are certain that the perception exists, we are not certain that it exists physically-- an obvious example being if the guitar were a mirage. Likewise, although there may be- indeed there is- a physical organ on which the mind is based (the brain) the mind in itself cannot possibly be physical, as we are certain of its existence. But anyway.
ReplyDeleteDefending my example against your critique is a complex matter, I think, and I won't do it only because the heart of your argument- that your consciousness may be based solely in *your* atoms, rather than those of a physically identical material arrangement- is refuted by a more important point: that in the infinities of time, anything that is physically possible will happen infinitely, including even the *re-arrangement* of *your* atoms into *your* brain. Whatever physical restriction you deem necessary, the fact that you exist now is proof that your existence is physically possible, and, by extension, that you will reincarnate. The only difference being, if what you suggest is reality, you couldn't, obviously, be perceptive through more brains than one.
To be aware across multiple brains is something I couldn't describe. That said, I believe awareness *is* tied to a mysterious substance- a non-physical substance, rooted in thought. It doesn't extend "everywhere" or "anywhere" because it is without position- it is nowhere. This, of course, isn't a "crazy new theory," but, rather, old as Ancient Greece.
I like that conception of a physical/non-physical distinction, and I think that's fine, but I think that the argument relies on a few generalities that might not hold about the mind. Discussions for another time.
ReplyDeleteAnd with that proof, we return to the issue of infinite time, and whether or not that's a useful concept. It's possible that exactly this physical arrangement will occur again, but even if I have happened before and will happen again in exactly this way, I suspect that I am left in exactly the same place: I have my life, as I live it now, and no awareness beyond such. I find it more likely that the universe, and our lives, are a unity, rather than a multiplicity.
You're right, that is an old theory, I was just speaking about the cognitive issues of laying it out technically. Old theories can be crazy new ones. I do think that the implications of a theory like that are worth thinking about, and what connection that would mean that the physical has to consciousness, if any. They get tricky.
Good talk, and good ideas.