Choice Tolerance

I've been profoundly influenced by Human Action - a work by Ludwig Von Mises, a critical figure in the haphazard compilation of oft-conflicting but generally accurate ideas umbrellaed under "Austrian economics" - and a foundational axiom outlined and discussed in the book's first part has had a rippling effect on the way I consider actions made by myself and others: that every man can read his own preference exactly, but the preferences of others not at all. Mises takes the point to its obvious 'economic' conclusion-- poking holes in the case for central planning-- but it also applies nicely to the general concept of action tolerance, as while one can always say "I'd do x if I were you," one can never say, with perfect confidence, "it is in your interest to do x." The statement "you don't really know what you want," is always false, and more so if followed by "but I do." You could explain to the man that without x he dies- but maybe that's what he desires- or that given x he inherits an instant million dollars, but maybe he'd rather not. Patterns of human behavior collectively allow the social sciences to make predictions about human action in groups, since the vast majority of people share certain preferences such as money and life, but on an individual level- in any given case- no one can possibly have authority to deem an action as certainly "wrong" (if by wrong we mean the "incorrect" action, or that which does not maximize net gain) if the one in question, him- or herself, deems it right.

On a simplistic level, everybody knows this. If you feed me chocolate and vanilla ice cream in two separate spoonfuls, respectively, my announcement that I prefer the former to the latter is taken as fact, since I'm far and away the single best person to verify. Whether 50% or 95% of all human beings on Earth prefer vanilla to chocolate, my word will be equally and fully accepted as truth if I state my preference the other way around. Thus, each and every time I'm asked "vanilla or chocolate?" people accept my response as what is certain to be the right option, rather than raise contentions.

However, we also know that there is another factor to be considered in decision making, and that is reason. No one contends that I should be served chocolate ice cream, but it's also generally accepted that every human being has the reasoning skills to determine which one of those would bring him greater satisfaction. As it happens, the vast majority of decisions people make require this same very insignificant level of reason-- I will call these sorts of decisions "minimal reason" decisions, which virtually everyone has the capacity to make-- but when it comes to something complicated like "invest in Apple Computers or start a business" people become more skeptical that one has the capability to choose correctly for himself. But then the question is raised- "who does?" No one can say with certainty that they are guaranteed to choose correctly, or even near-correctly, but generally we want as good as we can get-- and that will ultimately come down to two options:

1. The person directly affected

2. A person deemed very knowledgable

For each of those possibilities, I would propose there is an equation to be made with regard to their likelihood of choosing a correct or near-correct decision, with three major variables to consider:

1. The reasoning skills of the chooser

2. The knowledge of the preferences of the person directly affected

3. The chooser's intent

With regard to the reasoning skills of the chooser, it will remain at an imperfect level in either case. For very small children or otherwise underdeveloped persons, they may be, abnormally, in a position of only a barebones reasoning capacity, and this factor alone may rule them out as the best chooser of decisions that directly affect them. Thus, I would agree- as does almost anyone- that parents are just to make decisions for their young children, or for any vegetable child. Now we consider the case for those who are 'fully human.' On the one hand, the person deemed "knowledgable" will know more on the subject in question than the chooser, assuming he is deemed so correctly. On the other hand, the person affected has incentive to become more knowledgable so as to make the decision better, and has the capability to enhance his own reasoning skills on the subject-- even if that means hiring an advisor or asking free advice of someone who will not then *make* the decision, but will provide useful information. Of course, this would require that the person affected know at least the relative significance of the decision he's making, thereby allowing him to know whether his time and resources are worth investing to increase the likelihood of choosing appropriately, but I would contend that in most cases the determination of importance is of minimal reason (or something close), and arguably relates to the nature of his preference anyway-- which only he understands. Furthermore, one's conditions-- which are necessary to understand in order to reason appropriately-- are almost certainly understood better by the person directly affected. The only way the 'knowledgable person' could even remotely understand them is if he were a friend or family member, or else invested himself in the time-consuming process of studying-- which can only get him so far. He could ask the person directly affected about his conditions, but this would likely be rather unhelpful, as said person would have incentive to lie in whatever manner would cause the knowledgable person to align the decision more closely with the one that he who is directly affected wishes for.

With regard to preference, the person directly affected overwhelmingly prevails-- having a perfect understanding, as a function of human nature, of what it is his preferences are. The knowledgable person would have to rely on what statistics tell the majority of people tend to prefer-- and even this is an ironic means to attain such information, as most studies of preference are based upon actions that directly affected persons choose to make for themselves. He could ask the one directly affected, but once again the problem of incentivized deceit persists, as this person will explain his preferences in such a way that the decision made will more likely be the one he wants. Furthermore, even if the person were to be fully honest, preferences aren't easily described in words or mathematical speak, since they are interpreted by feelings.

With regard to intent, the palm must go again to the one directly affected according to the axiom of rationality. People desire to pursue ends that maximize their well-being, meaning that if the person directly affected is also the decision maker, he has the perfect intentions, and therefore the perfect incentive to make the right choice. When it comes to someone else making that decision for him, this can never be the case and is often far from it (especially with government bureaucrats, but we won't go into that).

"Ah, but then," you say "I know where you, Jacob, have erred. For the 'right' decision is not that which brings maximum net gain to the person directly affected, but that which brings maximum net gain to all sentient beings! How then can you suggest, oh foolish Jacob, that it is somehow better for the incentive to be benefiting he who is directly affected rather than benefiting any other person- such as he who is deemed knowledgable?" And the answer to that is, quite simply, that the person directly affected is essentially *always* the person who is *most* affected. If the vast majority of the impact hits one specific individual, the total net-gain is guaranteed to be larger if *his* net-gain is maximized, rather than if the net-gain is maximized for some other person that happens to know something about the decision's subject. 

Thus, freedom wins, and so does choice tolerance. This only applies, however, to those decisions that are not of significant negative impact to other human beings. Actions that involve physical, non-retaliatory harm invoke the non-aggresion axiom, and require the consent of those harmed on moral grounds, for universally accepted and otherwise obvious reasons (besides the fact that without such recognition, rational action would very often lead to "incorrect" decisions)-- it should be recognized that this classifies all governments as inherently evil and illegitimate institutions, but I digress.

Any fully-human being that acts without victims-- provided his actions do not significantly harm others against their will in a non-retalitory fashion-- should not only be fully free to do so, on both moral and utilitarian grounds, but cannot be labeled as one who acts immorally, and cannot be told, with any degree of confidence, that they are unfit to rule themselves. There is no other person more fit to make these actions.