Justice?

You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.

In order to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are — at least in certain crucial mental respects.

But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.

So you cannot be ultimately responsible for what you do.

The argument above, posed by the delightfully interesting Galen Strawson, a British philosopher of mind, has the ethics-guts of many in terrible knots. It transcends the typical squabbling of free will- whether the self is physical, whether one's consciousness acts, etc.- by cutting to the heart of the matter: nothing is causa sui.

I think the argument is wrong-- in particular, the first assumption.

If we assume the self is non-physical and moves the brain, as I do, (I'm an interactionist dualist) we can posit that the actions of the self are limited only by the physical capabilities of the body.

While one's surroundings and their character have great influence on the actions they choose, the action remains, ultimately, theirs. And there remains no reason why their intent cannot be at least partially determined by will alone, such that the good man chooses good because it is good, and for no other reason.

Is this the manner in which the self acts? It remains unknown- but it isn't logically impossible. Further, assuming we are ultimately responsible is the safe and rational choice when indeed we might be.